Selfless Selves & the Paradox of the Individual:
Perspectives on the Ecological Self

May 2022

Much of the literature surrounding Arne Naess’ notion of the ‘ecological self’ (Naess 1986) has acknowledged, like Naess, that we in the West need to expand our concept of the self in tandem with increased identification with ‘nature’ in order to occasion more pro-ecological behaviour and avert the worst of biodiversity collapse and potential human extinction. However, in efforts to establish a doctrine of unity based on a wider, more empathetic and interconnected sense of self, it has been inferred that the notion of the individual as a discrete ‘unit’ of self, to use rather sterile language, should either be demoted or discarded in lieu of a higher-order, meshwork-type organism/consciousness in which individual identity is subsumed to the whole. 

Ecophilosophers, namely deep ecologists, may have ‘thrown the baby out with the bathwater’ by neglecting to discuss the biological and ontological necessity of discrete individuals/selves/identities within ecosystems and therefore within the broader whole. Individuality (or the notion of a boundaried self expressive of uniquely discernable identity) may have been conflated with individualism, a ‘metaphysically false and ecologically destructive’ ideology (Diehm 2007) that has led the Western world to live by a fatal story of separation, thus provoking responses from progressive thinkers seeking to move away from the narcissistic cult of the individual proliferating in modern society. While it is clear that individualism is not conducive to cultivating an ‘ecological self’ (generating, instead, the opposite effect), we should be mindful about conflating it with individuality or simply the existence of individuals. They are not the same thing - where one destroys life, the other enables it.

In the co-authored paper ‘A Symbiotic View of Life’, Scott F. Gilbert et al. go as far to claim ‘we have never been individuals’ (Gilbert et al. 2012), suggesting that we are instead ‘holobionts’; hosts comprised of multiple bionts within a ‘discrete ecological unit’ (Margulis & Fester 1991). Already the definition of holobiont undermines Gilbert’s claim by virtue of its ‘discrete’, singular, and boundaried nature as a ‘host’ or ‘unit’, despite its porosity. Might a holobiont be considered, to some degree, an individual or a self? Or perhaps, in the words of neurobiologist Francisco Varela, an assemblage of ‘selfless selves’? (Varela 1991).

In typical Western style, thinkers have transitioned from one end of the dualistic ‘either/or’ spectrum to the other by simply shifting from an atomistic, mechanistic perspective towards an equally (and somewhat paradoxically) reductionist holist or monist perspective (depending on how you look at it). This supposedly unified perspective threatens to flatten the diversity and subsequent expressivity of a world made from myriad interpenetrating individuals, selves, and identities that, in my view, emerge from and operate within a structure that is neither exclusively dualist or monist (but which, and this is important to note, can be expressive of both). Referencing ecofeminist Val Plumwood in the paper ‘Identification with Nature: What It Is and Why It Matters’, Christian Diehm echoes the former sentiment regarding the flattening of diversity in the following:

‘Val Plumwood believes that deep ecology theorists have embraced a version of ‘interconnectedness’ that is better described as a kind of ‘indistinguishability,’ an account of the self that ‘rejects boundaries between self and nature’ (1993, 176)... Such a version of identification with nature is problematic insofar as it suggests a difference-erasing holism that is questionable as a viable model for relationships based on respect for others. In the absence of this recognition, the ‘total-field image’ would remain suspect both as a metaphysics and as a ground for ethics.’ (Diehm 2007)

Counter to this ‘indistinguishability’, I suggest that a ‘both/and’ (or even a ‘both/and/beyond’) perspective, in which we are, for argument's sake, both atoms and wholes (and beyond) at the same time, may provide a more ecologically integrous picture of the relational structure of the world in which individuals arise by virtue of the relationships between them, i.e. it is precisely the in-betweenness that connects us, not a lack thereof. To clarify this, I mean it is our separateness that paradoxically connects us, or, as biophilosopher Andreas Weber states, ‘we are connected because we are divided. We are connected by the logic of a paradox’ (Weber 2017). The aforementioned shift in perception towards a more diffuse self undermines the relevance of discrete individuality embedded within a wider relational and ecological context by failing to acknowledge the importance of these ‘separators’, i.e. boundaries as essential mediators of relationship and hence self. 

Philosopher Simone Weil stated that ‘every separation is a link’ (Weil 1947), borrowing from Plato’s idea of metaxy to describe the connecting distance and in-betweenness necessary to relating and therefore to the formation of identity/self. Membranes and thresholds facilitate the osmosis necessary to ecological reality, while at the same time excluding that which is not conducive to a particular context, highlighting the unique needs and self-preservation activities of organisms and other matter that require circumstances unique to it in order to exist. Gilbert et al. gesture towards these boundaries in the following statement, suggesting that, despite their argument that individuals don’t exist, organisms do exist outside of one another such that they need to cross ‘passport control’ in order to reach the body (which is, again, a discrete unit):

‘To use an anthropomorphic analogy, the immune system is not merely the body’s ‘armed forces’. It is also the ‘passport control’ that has evolved to recognize and welcome those organisms that help the body.’ (Gilbert et al. 2012)

The central point I am attempting to make is that I believe we are individuals and, paradoxically, not individuals at the same time insofar as we have identity, agency, needs, conativity and perspective while being equally entangled in a matrix of interdependent, symbiotic, and mutually engendering relationships with other beings. These beings range from the ‘more-than-human’, broadly conceived, to metaphysical, abiotic and symbolic ‘beings’ (and so on), i.e. entities, material or otherwise, with which we interact and from which sensations and perspectives arise which dictate and influence our experience of aliveness. It seems that most of the literature in the realm of the ecological self is seeking to validate only one of these possibilities - either we are entangled or we are separate. Varela supports this idea that we are paradoxically both in the following:

‘Whence the intriguing paradoxicality proper to an autonomous identity: the living system must distinguish itself from its environment, while at the same time maintaining its coupling with it from which it cannot be detached since it is against this very environment that it comes forth.’ (Varela 1991)

Poets have long understood this ‘life instigating dialectic’ (Weber 2017) between self and other, as well as the paradoxes that arise out of this ‘connection-in-separation’ (Weber 2017). See the below quotes from David Whyte and Walt Whitman, each of which gestures towards the ‘give and take’ that defines relating and the subsequent becoming-through-relating and also the multiplicity contained within this formation of self:

‘Our life like a breath, then, a give and a take, a bridge, a central movement, between singing a separate self and learning to be selfless.’ (Whyte 2020)

‘We live by unconsciously measuring the inverse distances of our proximity: an intimacy calibrated by the vulnerability we feel in giving up our sense of separation.’ (Whyte 2020)

‘Do I contradict myself? Very well then, I contradict myself. I am large, I contain multitudes.’ (Whitman 1892)

This interpenetration of perceived opposites (self/other and nearness/distance etc.) enables individuality while at the same time contradicting it, but it only contradicts it when perceived through a dualist, reductionist, reason-biased lens that assumes the existence of one inevitably invalidates the existence of the other based on the irreconcilable nature of paradox. To be explicit, I am not suggesting that the scholarship on symbiosis and interconnection etc. is wrong. I do not subscribe to atomistic or individualistic thinking, nor do I believe that the world is made of purely autonomous individuals seeking to satisfy egocentric needs. I believe we are ‘holobionts’, but I also believe that within these porous relational structures the discrete expressivity of individual selves is not only desirable but ecologically necessary, and we should therefore be careful when it comes to undermining the notion of the individual in efforts to erase destructive and selfish behaviour in humans (and even elsewhere in the natural world). Individuality, or the presence of discernable selves, is ecologically necessary for the same reason that biodiversity is necessary - we depend on difference insofar as it renders ecosystems resilient and able to cope with change. Homogeneity renders ecosystems fragile, as is evident in monoculture etc. Diehm suggests deep ecologists have neglected the vital importance of difference (or diversity) in the following:

‘Commentators have argued that if deep ecological consciousness has failed when boundaries between self and others are perceived (i.e., when we have not fully identified ourselves with nature), then deep ecological thinking suffers from an inability to respect others' difference from the self.’ (Diehm 2007)

While Naess does not explicitly suggest that we should discard the self/individual but instead suggests that we expand it, he neglects the possibility that the self is, as Weber states, ‘only self-through-other’ (Weber 2019). Put simply, the self exists only because there are others and because there is difference. Naess’ notion of the ‘wide self’ appears to contradict this self-through-other dialectic on the level of metaphor. Where are the boundaries within and outside of the wide self? How wide is wide? Where is the perimeter that enables us to know our ‘ecological self’? I am not suggesting that Naess did not consider this, but I am suggesting that his lack of precise language around it may be neglectful of nuances necessary to a more integrous understanding of our place in the world. Naess states the following:

‘His [William James] 100-page chapter on the consciousness of the self stresses the plurality of components of the wide and deep self as a complex entity. (Unfortunately, he prefers to talk about the plurality of selves. I think it may be better to talk about the plurality of the components of the wide self).’ (Naess 1986)

The ‘wide self’ Naess posits reiterates this homogenising impulse which threatens to flatten the validity of individual expressiveness within the biosphere. James’ perspective is more favourable in my view because he gestures towards plurality, which I believe is a more accurate way of perceiving and encountering a world that, despite our attempts through the application of reason-based map-making, refuses to be pinned down as one solid, definable ‘thing’. We know through our own lives that the self is not a fixed ‘essence’ (unless you subscribe to particular religious views). We are forever changing, forever inhabiting different fragments of personality, appearance and other factors related to identity which are, in turn, informed and moulded by the ever-changing environments and contexts we find ourselves in. Perhaps the monistic influence of Advaita Vedanta on Naess ecosophy is more evident in this statement - echoes of ‘oneness’ ring clear. Naess even explicitly refers to ‘working out anew’ this ‘crude monism’ in the below:

‘The newborn lacks, of course, any conceptions, however, rudimentary, corresponding to the tripartation - subject, object, medium. Probably the conception (not the concept) of one’s own ego comes rather late, say after the first year. A vague net of relations comes first. This network of perceived relations is neutral, fitting what in British philosophy was called ‘neutral monism’. The whole, their universe and altogether, lacks the tripartation at this early stage. In a sense, it is this basic sort of crude monism we are working out anew, not by trying to be babies again, but by better understanding our ecological self.’ (Naess 1986)

Another key point in this argument is that we are individuals by virtue of our relationships. Some scholars have acknowledged this. Anthropologist Marylin Strathern coined the term ‘dividual’, meaning ‘a person constitutive of relationships’ (Strathern 1988). Weber says that ‘living agents bring each other into being by establishing relationships’ (Weber 2019), and Diehm states:

‘The ‘relational, total-field’ perspective thus views humans not as discrete entities or substances, but as beings whose identity is a product of relationships to, among other things, the non-human environment. On this model, an essential aspect of being human is being caught up in networks of relations that include the natural world; humans, like all other entities, are inextricably enmeshed in more broad ecological or biospheric realities.’ (Diehm 2007)

Relationships form identity and hence a sense of self. It therefore makes sense, to a degree, to say relationships precede identity/self, however, relationships must occur between things in order for there to be a relationship in the first place, meaning that discrete things must exist so that a relationship can come into fruition. I hesitate to use the term ‘thing’ when what I really mean is organism or entity, but for argument’s sake ‘thing’ will suffice because relationships don’t just occur between living, organic matter (for example, relationships can occur between abstract thoughts or abiotic objects etc.). It is also not the case that just because a ‘thing’ is distinct in its ‘thingyness’ does not mean it is not also enmeshed in a web of other things and relationships. This is precisely the point. Paradoxical enmeshment brings forth individuality/self. Weber reiterates this in the following: 

‘Individuality in its physical, social, and symbolic sense can emerge only through a biologically shared and culturally communicated commons… The beauty of living things stems from the fact that they are embodied solutions of individual-existence-in-connection. They are gradients expressive of the perennial paradox between total autonomy and complete fusion that needs to be held in suspense by every living being.’ (Weber 2017)

If we are to develop an ‘ecological self’, might it have a greater capacity for complexity and plurality than simply saying ‘if not dualism, then monism’ (ironically a dualist statement in and of itself) or ‘if not individual, then community’, or ‘if not autopoiesis, then sympoiesis’? Might an ecological self enable us to inhabit a small and wide self? A boundaried and porous self? What if both sides of the coin are visible in one glance? And what of that which is beyond the coin? A question this essay does not have the scope to answer, but perhaps the below reflection on animism from Graham Harvey gestures towards what I am getting at in terms of inhabiting a more spacious and pluralistic view:

‘Animism is neither monist nor dualist, it is only just beginning when you get beyond counting one, two… At its best it is thoroughly, gloriously, unashamedly, rampantly pluralist.’ (Harvey 2012)

While the literature around the ecological self has sought to widen our identification with ‘nature’ and hence inspire a healthier relationship to it (and to ourselves, as part of nature - the very thing we are trying to relate with), it has also neglected key nuances regarding the ecological and ontological necessity of the discrete individual, self and identity. While it is clear that we in the West need to move beyond perceiving ourselves as isolated, atomistic agents, and acting as such, it is also clear that attempts to fully erase the notion of the individual are sometimes misguided and often ineffective. I have witnessed this in a personal context within ‘intentional’ communities where the individual has been demonised in attempts to establish more explicitly communal and interconnected ways of being. Anyone seen as differentiating themselves or acting on behalf of their needs is often labelled as an individualist (or similar such sentiments that lean towards insult and exclusion). What resulted was the needs of individuals being neglected to the point that they became even more extractive in their efforts to get those often very basic or core needs met, needs which ultimately allowed them to exist well as a human being. This pattern is also visible on a wider societal level. So it seems to be a question of cultivating spaciousness for a both/and/beyond perspective and allowing these multiple ‘realities’ to co-exist in the same moment without compulsively trying to eradicate that which appears to be illogical from the picture. So much of the natural world operates outside of this dualistic ‘either/or’ binary, and given we are a part of nature it would make sense that we can exist in this way too, so that our ecological selves may thrive among others. 

References

Diehm, Christian. (2007). ‘Identification with Nature: What It Is and Why It Matters’. Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 12, No. 2.
Gilbert, Scott F., & Sapp, Jan, & Tauber, Alfred I. (2012). ‘A Symbiotic View of Life: We Have Never Been Individuals’. The Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol. 87, No. 4. 
Harvey, Graham. (2012). ‘An Animist Manifesto’. PAN: Philosophy, Activism, Nature, No.9. 
Margulis, Lynn & Fester, René. (1991). Symbiosis as a Source of Evolutionary Innovation Speciation and Morphogenesis. MIT Press.
Naess, Arne. (1987). ‘Self-realization: an ecological approach to being in the world.’ The Trumpeter 4 (3): 35-42.
Strathern, Marylin. (1990). The Gender of the Gift. University of California Press.
Varela, Francisco J. (1991). ‘Organism, Cognitive Science and the Emergence of Selfless Selves’. Revue européenne des sciences sociales, T. 29, No. 89.
Weber, Andreas. (2019). Enlivenment: Toward a Poetics for the Anthropocene. The MIT Press.
Weber, Andreas. (2017). Matter and Desire: An Erotic Ecology. Chelsea Green Publishing.
Weil, Simone. (2002). Gravity and Grace. Routledge. 
Whitman, Walt. (2004). ‘Song of Myself (1892)’. Walt Whitman: The Complete Poems. Penguin.
Whyte, David. (2020). ‘A Seeming Stillness’ & ‘Close’. David Whyte: Essentials. Many Rivers Press.